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The Second Indochina War
4th Infantry Division (Ivy) & 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) From The Beginning to The End (A Supplement to Dak To Memories) |
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Note: Special Forces Camps around Dak To are described here. For a large topo map showing these locations, Click Here.
Dak To Memories website was developed and produced by Ernie Camacho who served his yearlong tour at Dak To, Republic of Vietnam, as an Air Traffic Controller ((ATC), from 1967-1968. Ernie’s vision was to capture the memories and experiences of those who spent their time in Viet Nam in the Dak To area.
The Dak To Fire Support Base (FSB) was a large, Brigade size base camp that belonged to the 4th Infantry Division (Ivy). From 1967 – 1969, Dak To was home to the division’s 1st Brigade as well as all the Army, Air Force, Special Forces, and other units and organizations that supported the 1st Brigade or were stationed at Dak To to support their own mission. Besides those stationed at Dak To, other units came and went as their missions and assignments took them to and from the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.
Those who spent any time at Dak To will remember it as being in a valley surrounded by steep mountains lush with triple canopy jungle. Situated about sixty-five kilometers north of Pleiku, where the 4th Infantry Division’s main base camp was located, Dak To was strategically located about 20 kilometers from the juncture of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh Trail ran from north to south through those countries with part of the trail egressing into South Vietnam where the three countries were joined.
The three infantry battalions that comprised the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division’s Infantry battalions, occupied fire support bases (FSB) positioned from northwest of to southwest of Dak To. These firebases were positioned on defensible high ground that enabled their direct support artillery (105mm howitzers) to provide fire support to their maneuver units.
For these troops, a typical day would be spent climbing or descending the steep mountains of the Central Highlands looking for signs of the enemy, e.g., footprints on a trail, bunkers or trenches, commo wire, or any of the other detritus of war. This routine might last for days, but eventually, the NVA would show him-self with an exploding booby-trap, or a single shot from a sniper’s rifle. These overt acts frequently resulted in a killed or wounded GI which would then kick-off a sequence of events to locate an opening where a medivac helicopter could access the area to medivac the KIA or WIA. Depending on the time of the day, the event might trigger a decision to do a thorough search of the area and then establish a night lager position. Patrols might be sent out to determine any additional signs of the enemy, coordinate fire support from the unit’s direct support artillery, and resupply food, water, and ammunition. Defensive fires to include mortars, machine guns, and claymore mines would be implemented and communications via radio and telephone would be reliably established.
All these necessary actions would be taken before sundown which usually came early due to the jungle which brought on darkness very quickly. To the extent possible, troops would dig foxholes to provide as much protection as possible from enemy direct and indirect fire weapons. At this point, troops detailed as the first shift of listening posts (LPs) would move forward; others would try and get some sleep, awaiting their turn as LP which would come later during the night.
Getting sleep was a misnomer as the jungle would come alive with the sounds of bugs and other organisms whose day began as soon as the sun went down. And, of course, the sounds made by unfriendly humans might be heard, especially by the FNGs (f___ new guys) who were just beginning their 12-month tour of duty “in the ‘nam”. Throughout the night, artillery rounds could be heard impacting in the distance as the artillery batteries fired their programs of Harassing and Interdicting (H&I) fire against pre-established locations where enemy activity might well be taking place.
In the Dak To area, some of these H&I fires might be shot by long-range artillery such as the 175mm self-propelled guns that could reach targets out to 33,000 meters. These guns were especially effective against troops on foot and truck convoys moving down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Closer-in targets could be engaged with 155mm towed howitzers and 8-inch self-propelled howitzers as well as the battalion’s direct support artillery. Fire Support doctrine always sought to cover maneuver units with at least two batteries of direct support artillery. This was necessary to insure that in the event that friendly troops somehow got positioned on the gun-target line, at least one battery would be able to deliver effective fire support without endangering the friendly troops.
Overall, fighting at night took on a level of violence more associated with artillery and tactical air strikes while the involvement of soldiers was scaled back to the “watch and see” performed by lookouts, sentries and those skilled in the use of night vision sensors and optics. The rapid advancement of this technology has changed the whole complexion of combat in low light conditions.
While the U.S. and allies focused on improving combat efficiency by improving the effectiveness of weapons and equipment and maximizing the human-machine interface, the VC and NVA focused on improving basic soldering skills such as camouflaging individuals, positions, vehicles, and equipment. They could move noiselessly in the field and breech barbed wire and obstacles without tripping flares or mines or giving away their location. They were experts at emplacing booby traps and simple lethal objects such as punji stakes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The NVA were skillful diggers and demonstrated the ability to use shovels and earth to construct tunnels that avoided wire obstacles and enemy fighting positions. Their accomplishments against the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, and against the U.S. Special Forces and the CIDG during the Battle of Ben Het, are legion. Elsewhere in Vietnam, the complex of tunnels in the Cu Chi region was never fully identified, nor defeated.
While Dak To was not impregnable, it did serve as a defensible hub for artillery and logistical support as well as all the air support needed short of B52s, tactical fighter bombers, specialty reconnaissance aircraft, and gunships armed with Gatling type weapons and 105mm howitzers. Dak To FSB could manage Air Force cargo aircraft up to the size of the C130 Hercules which continues to present day (53 years later) to perform the same missions for the US Air Force as well as several allied nations.
My tour in Vietnam overlapped with Ernie’s, but we did not know each other at the time. We met through Ernie’s Dak To Memories website. During my first tour in Vietnam, I was an avid picture-taker and Ernie felt that my photos would contribute to the website. Many of the photos include the Dak To 4th Infantry Division (Ivy), 1st Fire Support Bases and the Dak Seang, Ben Het, and Dak Pek Special Forces camps. These photos convey a lot about the Central Highlands, the firebases, the Montagnard people, our wonderful soldiers, and airmen, as well as photos of objects that I felt revealed the characteristics of the country and the culture of the Vietnamese and Indigenous peoples, especially the children. I was often taken by simple things – water buffalo, banana trees, the rambling nature of the Dak Poko River, and the destruction to the countryside and hamlets caused by the explosive nature of war.
Hopefully, these photos will add to the value of the website, and that those who were there might recognize something that will remind them of that time in their life.
Due to the many photos of Dak To, Ben Het, and Dak Pek, we decided that each of those Special Forces locations was a story unto itself and the story of Dak To was indelibly inter-twined with the events that took place from 1967 until the end of the war. The need to tell those stories motivated more research to do a deep dive into the events that formed the history of those locations. This I have done through internet research and inclusion of information that I felt would be interesting and useful.
What I have written is not original. I freely admit to including information that was provided and discussed by others who shared similar experiences as I did. I hoped to convey my thoughts at the time I snapped the pictures, but in hindsight, I realize that too much time has passed in my life to correctly recall that level of detail. As the saying goes, “It is what it is” and if the photographs and captions are entertaining and informative then “mission accomplished”. That said, I have tried to be factual and accurate, but with the passage of time (53 years), memories have grown dim. Any errors of fact are mine alone and I trust that all the Valorous Decorations, many earned posthumously, have been properly acknowledged. The battles in and around Dak To and the nearby firebases and Special Forces camps were a major part of the war in Vietnam and those who are interested will find a plethora of detail by searching the web for “dakto” or “dak to”. Lastly, I hope that those who still carry the burdens of their experiences will find some solace and pride in knowing that we served our country as best we could.
Respectfully,
N. W. Spaulding, US Army, Infantry Officer, (Retired)
How it all Began
The French Indochina federation was a grouping of French colonial territories formed on October 17, 1887, in Southeast Asia, and lasted until its demise in 1954. It included three Vietnamese regions of Tonkin in the north, Annam in the center, and Cochinchina in the south, Cambodia, Laos (from 1899) and the Chinese territory of Guangzhouwan (from 1898 until 1945). The capital for most of its history (1902-45) was Hanoi. The capital from 1887 to 1902 and again from 1945 to 1954 was Saigon. The French annexed Cochinchina and established a protectorate in Cambodia in 1862 and 1863 respectively. After the French took over northern Vietnam through the Tonkin campaign in 1887, the various protectorates were merged into one union. Two more entities were incorporated into the union: the Laotian protectorate and the Chinese territory of Guangzhouwan.
The French exploited the resources in the region during their rule, but they also contributed to improve the health and education system in the region. Nevertheless, deep divides remained between the natives and colonists, leading to sporadic rebellions by the latter. After the fall of France during World War II, the colony was administered by the Vichy government and was under Japanese occupation until March 1945, when the Japanese overthrew the colonial regime. When the Japanese surrendered in September 1945, the Viet Minh, a communist organization led by Ho Chi Minh, declared Vietnamese independence, but France subsequently took back control of French Indochina after the war ended. An all-out independence war, known as the First Indochina War, broke out in late 1946 between French and Viet Minh forces.
To counter the Viet Minh, the State of Vietnam, led by former Emperor Băo Dai, was proclaimed in 1949. French efforts to reunite Vietnam were unsuccessful. On October 22 and November 9, 1953, the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia proclaimed their respective independences. Following the Geneva Accord of 1954, the French withdrew from Vietnam, which had been split into two countries (until 1976), and French Indochina was no more.
The Role of the United States in the Vietnam War
The United States interest in Vietnam began after World War II and escalated into full commitment during the Vietnam War, from 1955 to 1973. The U.S. involvement in South Vietnam stemmed from a combination of factors: France’s long colonial history in French Indochina, the U.S. war with Japan in the Pacific, and both Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong’s pledge in 1950 to support Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh’s guerrilla forces.
Despite being concerned about Communist commitments to the Viet Minh, the U.S. was adamantly against providing any aid to France that would in any way prop up their struggle to maintain its pre-WWII colonial empire. However, Stalin and Mao’s offering their support to the Viet Minh in 1950 changed the battlefield dynamic and geopolitical character of the struggle to one of a global conflict against Maoist and Stalinist expansionism.
In September 1950, the U.S. began to moderately back the French. Beginning with $10 Million worth of military supplies, President Harry S. Truman, from that initial support, provided progressively increasing amounts of financial and military assistance to French forces fighting in what was still in the minds of the Western powers, French Indochina. Beginning in 1951, U.S. involvement increased from just assisting French forces to providing direct military assistance to the associated states (Annam, Tonkin, Laos, and Cambodia).
Eventually, U.S. missions were conducted at a more consistent rate by sending increasing amounts of military assistance. Their main intent was to restrict Communist expansion in Indochina as they thought it would soon lead to Communist takeovers in Thailand, Laos, Malaya, and all of what later became Vietnam (the so-called Domino Effect). This would have resulted in a change in the balance of power throughout Asia. The U.S. foreign policy establishment saw the U.S.’s national security and Western Europe’s interests being marginalized due to the rise of this Communist expansion, and thus it took steps it felt were necessary to restrict it.
Under Truman, the support increased from $10 million in September 1950 to $150 Million by the end of 1951. The struggle passed from Truman to President Eisenhower, who saw the fall of French Indochina, and in 1961 the Eisenhower administration passed the conflict to the Kennedy administration. In May 1961, Kennedy sent five hundred more military advisers, bringing American forces in Vietnam to 1,400. The budget increase, coupled with more advisors being sent to Vietnam, began to arouse concern within certain segments of the U.S. government and among the people of the United States.
The Vietnam War, also known as the Second Indochina War, was a conflict in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from November 1, 1955, to the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. It was officially fought between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. North Vietnam was supported by the Soviet Union, China, and other communist allies; South Vietnam was supported by the United States, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and other anti-communist nations. Ultimately, estimates of the number of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians killed vary from 966,000 to 3,812,000. Currently, records report that the conflict resulted in 58,318 U.S. fatalities though this number is likely to increase. (see footnote 1)
The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and its role in Vietnam
The 5th SFG(A) saw extensive action in the Vietnam War and played a pivotal role in the early months of the war. The 5th Group - as it is sometimes called - is designed to deploy and execute nine doctrinal missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, counterinsurgency, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, information operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and security force aid.
As of 2016, the 5th SFG (A) operated primarily within the CENTCOM area of responsibility as part of the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). The 5th SFG (A) specializes in operations in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa (HOA). The 5th SFG (A) and two of its battalions spend six months out of every twelve deployed to Iraq as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula. However, these commitments could change as U.S. troops are disengaging in that part of the world and focusing more attention on developing threats elsewhere.
Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the number of Special Forces advisers in Vietnam steadily increased. Their responsibility was to train South Vietnamese soldiers in the art of counterinsurgency and to mold various native tribes into a credible anti-communist threat.
Initially, elements from the different SF groups were involved in advising the South Vietnamese. In September 1964, the 5th SF Group was formed exclusively to conduct operations in Vietnam. The 5th SF Group set up its provisional headquarters in Nha Trang. Six months later, in February, Nha Trang became the 5th SF Group permanent headquarters. From that point on, all SF Soldiers in Vietnam were assigned to the 5th SF Group until 1971, when the group returned to Fort Bragg. However, a small number of 5th Group members were re-deployed to Thailand where they continued to conduct over-the-border operations into North Vietnam.
By the time the 5th SF Group left Southeast Asia, SF soldiers had earned 17 Medals of Honor, one Distinguished Service Medal, 90 Distinguished Service Crosses, 814 Silver Star Medals, 13,234 Bronze Star Medals, 235 Legions of Merit, 46 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 232 Soldier’s Medals, 4,891 Air Medals, 6,908 Army Commendation Medals and 2,658 Purple Hearts. It was a brilliant record, built on blood and sacrifice.
Not to be overlooked, other SF training teams were operating in the 1960s in Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. Southeast Asia, however, was the SF’s primary focus. Through their unstinting labors, SF troops eventually established 254 outposts throughout Vietnam, many of them defended by a single A-team and hundreds of friendly natives. But fighting in remote areas of Vietnam - publicity to the contrary - wasn’t the only mission of SF. It was also responsible for training thousands of Vietnam’s ethnic tribe members in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. SF took the Montagnard’s, the Nungs, the Cao Dei and others and molded them into the 60,000-strong Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). CIDG troops became the SF’s most valuable ally in battles fought in faraway corners of Vietnam, out of reach of conventional back-up forces.
Included amongst the 254 outposts are many that will be remembered whenever the dangers of A-Team duty on the borders of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are discussed. Names like Nam Dong, Lang Vei, Dak To, A Shau, Plei Mei, Dak Seang, Ben Het, and Dak Pek are places that will long be remembered in the lore of Special Forces operations in Vietnam. Those who kept the enemy at bay will never forget. Most will acknowledge that the North Vietnamese soldier and his Viet Cong counterpart were worthy opponents - tough, brave, and not afraid to stand and fight for their cause.
While the SF A-teams executed their missions around the nucleus of the outpost, other SF organizations conducted clandestine missions, the details of which are not as well known. A-Teams were involved with civic-action projects such as building schools, hospitals, and government buildings, and providing medical care to civilians.
Meanwhile, there was another side of the SF mission that was less focused on winning the hearts and minds of the people. SF personnel were instrumental in the covert war against North Vietnam. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - Studies and Observation Group, or MACV-SOG, conducted cross-border operations into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam to disrupt the enemy’s use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, while other SF-led teams ran-in-country long-range reconnaissance patrols under the Delta, Sigma and Omega projects.
Dak To and Ben Het Special Forces Camps.
During the final years of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Special Forces maintained six A-Camps along South Vietnam’s mountainous western border in the Central Highlands. Bu Prang, Duc Lap, Duc Co, Dak Pek, Dak Seang and Ben Het. These outposts would all see intense action as each was besieged by the NVA, who did little to hide their intentions for the camps.
The fighting at Ben Het was joined with the U.S. Army’s 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division which had moved to Dak To in 1967. Prior to the arrival of the 4th Infantry Division, other Army units had moved in and out of the Dak To area, usually in response to NVA buildups in the surrounding mountains. The most famous of these battles was the 173 Airborne Brigade’s battle for Hill 875, southwest of Dak To.
The Battle for Hill 875 was a 5-day engagement during the Battle of Dak To in Kontum province which took place during November 1967. At 09:43 on 19 November, three companies (330 men) of 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment moved into positions to assault Hill 875. Charlie and Delta companies moved up the slope followed by two platoons of Alpha Company in the classic "two up one back" formation utilized since World War I.
At 10:30, as the Americans moved to within three hundred meters of the crest, NVA machine gunners opened fire. They attempted to continue the advance, but the North Vietnamese, well concealed in interconnected bunkers and trenches, opened fire with small arms and grenades.
At 18:58 one of the worst friendly fire incidents of the Vietnam War occurred when a Marine Corps fighter-bomber dropped two 500-pound bombs into 2/503's perimeter. One of the bombs exploded in the trees above the center of the position, where the combined command groups, the wounded, and the medics were all located. It killed forty-two men outright and wounded forty-five more. In the end, the battle of Hill 875 had cost over one hundred American lives lost, over 250 wounded, and seven missing.
In early 1968, the SF A-Team located at Dak To relocated to Ben Het where they established an outpost on a barren mountaintop just six miles east of the point where Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam borders converge. Ben Het was strategically important because it was close to the Ho Chi Minh Trail which enabled SF reconnaissance operations to keep a close watch on NVA supply activities and troop movements.
Ben Het was supported by a 12-man SF A-team and some two hundred Montagnard tribe members. After moving to Ben Het, the SF A-team and their Montagnard’s worked diligently to make the camp defensible and create housing for the Montagnard families. By 1969, the outpost was well established and believed capable of defending themselves against the size of NVA units that infiltrated into South Vietnam in that area.
In early 1969, intelligence reports began to indicate that the NVA were planning a major offensive in the Central Highlands. Intelligence indicated that the NVA were equipped with tanks for the first time in the Vietnam war. In late February and early March, the camp placed anti-tank mines in the roads surrounding the camp in anticipation of the NVA using tanks.
On March 3rd, the NVA attacked the camp with almost 650 rounds of artillery followed by an Infantry ground assault against the west side of the camp by a battalion from the 66th NVA Regiment, supported by 10 PT-76 tanks.
The assault was directed at a point where a CIDG company was dug in and supported by several U.S. M-48 Patton tanks. The NVA tanks drove into the minefield and two were knocked out. Later during the battle, an American tank was hit, and two crew members killed. The camp managed to successfully defend itself and the NVA retreated when friendly reinforcements, known as the MIKE force, arrived to relieve the defenders. (see footnote 2)
As the 1969 monsoon season fell upon the area, the camps at Ben Het and Dak To were again besieged by the 28th and 66th NVA Regiments from late May until June 29th. The roads were cut in various places and the NVA assumed positions to fire on aircraft attempting to use the airstrip. Air resupply became a problem. Often, Air Force C-7 Caribou transport aircraft had to parachute their loads into the camp. For any aircraft attempting to land, a full saturation by ground support aircraft was needed to silence the gauntlet of ground fire. First, the hills surrounding Ben Het were softened up by A-1 fighter-bombers trying to make the North Vietnamese gunners keep their heads down. A Forward Air Controller (FAC) supervised the Caribous' approach, with a pair of Air Force F-4 Phantom fighter bombers stacked up to react on his call to any anti-aircraft fire. Planes dropped smoke just before the Caribous lined up for their final approach.
By late June, with the battle imminent, the C7-A Caribous could no longer land to unload. Supplies had to be airdropped. Two hundred tons of supplies arrived this way between June 10 and the end of the battle.
On June 23d, there was a serious probing attack that led to a three-hour firefight. One American was killed and a half-dozen more wounded. The NVA were estimated to have 1,500 to 2,000 troops in the immediate vicinity of the camp. They had dug trenches and tunnels under the north hill of the camp that went under all three barbed wire entanglements and reached the bunkers of the outer perimeter defenses. Note: The strategy of digging tunnels to approach an objective was used successfully by the NVA to defeat the French at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. They also used it at Khe Sanh to try to defeat the U.S. Marines. It did not work at Khe Sanh primarily due to the intensive bombing campaign that the U.S. waged around the clock. (see footnote 3)
The NVA used loudspeakers to attempt to get the CIDG to surrender. They broadcast messages in English and Vietnamese, then followed their message with a barrage of artillery and mortar shells. The U.S. countered with Air Force B-52 strikes that dropped 340 tons of bombs on the area surrounding the camp.
The NVA was broadcasting that Ben Het was the “Dien Bien Phu” for the American soldiers.
It was imperative that the roads to both Dak To and Kontum be reopened. The camp was running low on ammunition, especially illumination rounds. This was the first major test for the “Vietnamization” process for the U.S. pulling out and the ARVN troops taking over the defense of their country; the ammo resupply convoys had to get through.
The ARVN commander cleared the road around Dak To but needed considerable reinforcements to do so. He was augmented by four infantry battalions with half of the armor available in II Corps. The U.S. supported with a battery of 175mm guns along with a battalion of 105mm howitzers, a large amount of helicopter support as well as tactical air strikes and B-52 strikes.
The massive amount of firepower was brought to bear on the hills surrounding Ben Het and the once triple canopy jungle was stripped bare. But the NVA with their tunnels withstood most of it unscathed.
ARVN troops succeeded in getting a convoy over Road 512 from Dak To into Ben Het on June 24th, but it took heavy fighting most of the way to do so. Just outside of Ben Het, U.S. engineers clearing mines were ambushed by the NVA and suffered heavy casualties. The ARVN escort column for the engineers fled at the first shot.
Another convoy trying to make it into the camp was badly shot up. On June 27th, another company was tasked to air assault into the camp to help stem the tide. The NVA stepped up the artillery fire on the base, dropping 450 rounds into the camp, wounding nine Americans. The Americans countered with 60 B-52s that delivered 1,800 tons of bombs on NVA positions.
With the eyes of many watching the ARVN troops in their first real test on their own, they poured in troops to stop the NVA. At the peak of the battle, there were seven ARVN battalions joining the two American-led reinforcement battalions totaling close to 4,000 troops.
In the ensuing days, ARVN troop convoys continued to force their way down Rte. 512 and finally cleared the areas around Ben Het of NVA troops.
Although stopped at Ben Het, the NVA were not defeated. They faded back into the jungle as was their routine strategy when their opposition became too intense. In August, the same NVA regiments would siege the Special Forces camps at Bu Prang and Duc Lap.
By July 2d, the siege of Ben Het was declared over. The Ben Het camp was rebuilt and reinforced by engineers and all the bunkers strengthened.
Personnel losses during the battle included: one Special Forces Green Beret killed and sixteen wounded; one South Vietnamese Special Forces killed, and seven others wounded; 15 ARVN soldiers killed and seventy wounded; and 52 CIDG strikers killed and 141 wounded. There were twenty-three civilians killed and eleven wounded. Casualties among the U.S. artillery was high as well. NVA casualties were 183 killed around the Ben Het outpost in a series of firefights and 105 were killed northeast of Ben Het; most were killed by artillery.
The result was that the camp at Ben Het was powerless to stop the NVA from infiltrating from Cambodia along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The NVA were able to pin the CIDG strikers into the camp by siege and they couldn’t affect the NVA as envisioned.
However, the camp’s existence was a political victory (one of the few). The camp and the SF defenders had defeated every attempt to push them out, even when the NVA brought tanks into the wire.
While the U.S. Special Forces, artillerymen and armor troops fought a heck of a fight, it showed that the South Vietnamese, the ARVN, had a long way to go to being self-sufficient.
Dak To, Dak Seang, and Dak Pek Special Forces Camps.
During the final years of the U.S. Involvement in Vietnam, the Special Forces held onto six A-Camps along South Vietnam’s mountainous western border in the Central Highlands: Bu Prang, Duc Lap, Duc Co, Dak Seang, Ben Het, and Dak Pek.
Dak Pek Camp (also known as Dak Pek Special Forces Camp) was a former U.S. Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) base, located in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, about forty-five kilometers north of Dak To. The 5th Special Forces Group first established a base there in December 1962 to monitor communist infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
On 1 April 1970, the NVA attacked the camp, starting a siege that lasted until 8 May. At the same time the NVA attacked the Dak Pek Camp, the NVA also laid siege to the SF camp at Dak Seang, about twenty kilometers south of Dak Pek. On 15 April 1970, in response to the siege of Dak Seang, the 170th Assault Helicopter Company dropped the 3rd Battalion, 42nd ARVN Regiment into a nearby landing zone, losing two helicopters in the operation. Three days earlier, In the early hours of April 12, 1970, the NVA attacked the Special Forces A-team camp at Dak Pek, seizing more than half the base - including the high ground and some crew-served weapons - plus the surrounding valley and mountains.
The Aftermath for the 5th Special Forces (Airborne).
During America’s long war in Vietnam, many of the Green Berets who fought there became legends within the Special Forces Regiment. And among those warriors were the men of MACVSOG (Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group); the SOG warriors were among the finest the country has ever produced.
Major General George "Speedy" Gaspard.
Major General George "Speedy" Gaspard was one of the most well-known and respected officers from that generation. After serving with the Marine Corps in World War II, Gaspard joined the Army. He was an original, volunteering for the newly formed 10th Special Forces Group and attending Special Forces Class #1. He would run cross border operations in the Korean War, but really made his mark during the war in Vietnam, working in Special Forces A-Camps as well as running some of the most secret operations across the border into North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
George Wallace Gaspard Jr. was born at Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Ala., on August 5, 1926. He was the son of the late George W. Gaspard of MN, and Annie Lou Bamberg of AL.
He served in the United States Marine Corps from 1944 to 1946 and fought in the final battle of World War II on the island of Okinawa with the 6th Marine Division. He first entered the U.S. Army on June 11, 1951.
In May 1952, Gaspard was a student in the first all-officer class at the Ranger course. He then attended a special course at the Air Ground School located at Southern Pines, N.C. Afterward, he volunteered for the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), which had just been organized at Fort Bragg, N.C.
His first assignment was as a team leader of the 18th SF Operational Detachment. In November 1952, he attended Special Forces Class #1. The fledgling Special Forces unit, much of it comprised of World War II vets from the OSS, was anxious to get involved in the Korean War and conduct missions like those conducted in occupied areas of Europe and the Pacific during the war.
The SF troops were put in an active intelligence operation that utilized Tactical Liaison Offices (TLO). Although only anti-communist Koreans initially staffed them, the TLO would eventually conduct “line-crossing operations” which included using Chinese agents to gather intelligence on the enemy. However, the Far East Command (FEC) assigned the SF troops as individual replacements rather than as 15-man A-Teams that SF was employing at the time, using the OSS WWII Operational Group model.
In March 1953, then 1Lt. Gaspard was assigned to FEC/LD 8240AU FECOM. He commanded four soldiers and 80 South Korean agents, who were dispatched behind enemy lines to gather intelligence on the North Koreans. Obviously, the threat of double agents, something that would later haunt SOG operations in Vietnam, loomed. Gaspard was awarded the Silver Star and Bronze Star for actions in combat during June 11-12, 1953.
In October 1954, Gaspard joined the 77th SF Group (A) as a guerrilla warfare instructor with the Psychological Warfare School’s Special Forces Department. He was subsequently transferred to the 187th ARCT and honorably discharged in September 1957.
From 1960 to 1962, he served as a civilian mobilization designee with the Special Warfare department in the Pentagon. In April 1962, he was recalled to active duty and assigned to the 5th SF Group (A) at Fort Bragg, commanding Det A-13. In September, he opened a new Special Forces Camp in Kontum Province at Dak Pek, Vietnam, which remained the longest continuously active SF/ARVN Ranger camp until it was overrun in 1972. That would be the first of seven tours of duty in Vietnam for Gaspard.
During the early days of Vietnam, there was a general lack of accurate reporting by the press on the fighting. However, there were a handful of reporters who were willing to walk in the field and endure combat with the troops. One of those was Pulitzer Prize-winning author and reporter David Halberstam. He was a special correspondent with the New York Times and not a wire reporter, so he had the time to visit the troops and share a much closer look at what was truly transpiring on the ground.
The Dak To Fire Support Base (FSB) was a large, Brigade size base camp that belonged to the 4th Infantry Division (Ivy). From 1967 – 1969, Dak To was home to the division’s 1st Brigade as well as all the Army, Air Force, Special Forces, and other units and organizations that supported the 1st Brigade or were stationed at Dak To to support their own mission. Besides those stationed at Dak To, other units came and went as their missions and assignments took them to and from the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.
Those who spent any time at Dak To will remember it as being in a valley surrounded by steep mountains lush with triple canopy jungle. Situated about sixty-five kilometers north of Pleiku, where the 4th Infantry Division’s main base camp was located, Dak To was strategically located about 20 kilometers from the juncture of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh Trail ran from north to south through those countries with part of the trail egressing into South Vietnam where the three countries were joined.
The three infantry battalions that comprised the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division’s Infantry battalions, occupied fire support bases (FSB) positioned from northwest of to southwest of Dak To. These firebases were positioned on defensible high ground that enabled their direct support artillery (105mm howitzers) to provide fire support to their maneuver units.
For these troops, a typical day would be spent climbing or descending the steep mountains of the Central Highlands looking for signs of the enemy, e.g., footprints on a trail, bunkers or trenches, commo wire, or any of the other detritus of war. This routine might last for days, but eventually, the NVA would show him-self with an exploding booby-trap, or a single shot from a sniper’s rifle. These overt acts frequently resulted in a killed or wounded GI which would then kick-off a sequence of events to locate an opening where a medivac helicopter could access the area to medivac the KIA or WIA. Depending on the time of the day, the event might trigger a decision to do a thorough search of the area and then establish a night lager position. Patrols might be sent out to determine any additional signs of the enemy, coordinate fire support from the unit’s direct support artillery, and resupply food, water, and ammunition. Defensive fires to include mortars, machine guns, and claymore mines would be implemented and communications via radio and telephone would be reliably established.
All these necessary actions would be taken before sundown which usually came early due to the jungle which brought on darkness very quickly. To the extent possible, troops would dig foxholes to provide as much protection as possible from enemy direct and indirect fire weapons. At this point, troops detailed as the first shift of listening posts (LPs) would move forward; others would try and get some sleep, awaiting their turn as LP which would come later during the night.
Getting sleep was a misnomer as the jungle would come alive with the sounds of bugs and other organisms whose day began as soon as the sun went down. And, of course, the sounds made by unfriendly humans might be heard, especially by the FNGs (f___ new guys) who were just beginning their 12-month tour of duty “in the ‘nam”. Throughout the night, artillery rounds could be heard impacting in the distance as the artillery batteries fired their programs of Harassing and Interdicting (H&I) fire against pre-established locations where enemy activity might well be taking place.
In the Dak To area, some of these H&I fires might be shot by long-range artillery such as the 175mm self-propelled guns that could reach targets out to 33,000 meters. These guns were especially effective against troops on foot and truck convoys moving down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Closer-in targets could be engaged with 155mm towed howitzers and 8-inch self-propelled howitzers as well as the battalion’s direct support artillery. Fire Support doctrine always sought to cover maneuver units with at least two batteries of direct support artillery. This was necessary to insure that in the event that friendly troops somehow got positioned on the gun-target line, at least one battery would be able to deliver effective fire support without endangering the friendly troops.
Overall, fighting at night took on a level of violence more associated with artillery and tactical air strikes while the involvement of soldiers was scaled back to the “watch and see” performed by lookouts, sentries and those skilled in the use of night vision sensors and optics. The rapid advancement of this technology has changed the whole complexion of combat in low light conditions.
While the U.S. and allies focused on improving combat efficiency by improving the effectiveness of weapons and equipment and maximizing the human-machine interface, the VC and NVA focused on improving basic soldering skills such as camouflaging individuals, positions, vehicles, and equipment. They could move noiselessly in the field and breech barbed wire and obstacles without tripping flares or mines or giving away their location. They were experts at emplacing booby traps and simple lethal objects such as punji stakes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The NVA were skillful diggers and demonstrated the ability to use shovels and earth to construct tunnels that avoided wire obstacles and enemy fighting positions. Their accomplishments against the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, and against the U.S. Special Forces and the CIDG during the Battle of Ben Het, are legion. Elsewhere in Vietnam, the complex of tunnels in the Cu Chi region was never fully identified, nor defeated.
While Dak To was not impregnable, it did serve as a defensible hub for artillery and logistical support as well as all the air support needed short of B52s, tactical fighter bombers, specialty reconnaissance aircraft, and gunships armed with Gatling type weapons and 105mm howitzers. Dak To FSB could manage Air Force cargo aircraft up to the size of the C130 Hercules which continues to present day (53 years later) to perform the same missions for the US Air Force as well as several allied nations.
My tour in Vietnam overlapped with Ernie’s, but we did not know each other at the time. We met through Ernie’s Dak To Memories website. During my first tour in Vietnam, I was an avid picture-taker and Ernie felt that my photos would contribute to the website. Many of the photos include the Dak To 4th Infantry Division (Ivy), 1st Fire Support Bases and the Dak Seang, Ben Het, and Dak Pek Special Forces camps. These photos convey a lot about the Central Highlands, the firebases, the Montagnard people, our wonderful soldiers, and airmen, as well as photos of objects that I felt revealed the characteristics of the country and the culture of the Vietnamese and Indigenous peoples, especially the children. I was often taken by simple things – water buffalo, banana trees, the rambling nature of the Dak Poko River, and the destruction to the countryside and hamlets caused by the explosive nature of war.
Hopefully, these photos will add to the value of the website, and that those who were there might recognize something that will remind them of that time in their life.
Due to the many photos of Dak To, Ben Het, and Dak Pek, we decided that each of those Special Forces locations was a story unto itself and the story of Dak To was indelibly inter-twined with the events that took place from 1967 until the end of the war. The need to tell those stories motivated more research to do a deep dive into the events that formed the history of those locations. This I have done through internet research and inclusion of information that I felt would be interesting and useful.
What I have written is not original. I freely admit to including information that was provided and discussed by others who shared similar experiences as I did. I hoped to convey my thoughts at the time I snapped the pictures, but in hindsight, I realize that too much time has passed in my life to correctly recall that level of detail. As the saying goes, “It is what it is” and if the photographs and captions are entertaining and informative then “mission accomplished”. That said, I have tried to be factual and accurate, but with the passage of time (53 years), memories have grown dim. Any errors of fact are mine alone and I trust that all the Valorous Decorations, many earned posthumously, have been properly acknowledged. The battles in and around Dak To and the nearby firebases and Special Forces camps were a major part of the war in Vietnam and those who are interested will find a plethora of detail by searching the web for “dakto” or “dak to”. Lastly, I hope that those who still carry the burdens of their experiences will find some solace and pride in knowing that we served our country as best we could.
Respectfully,
N. W. Spaulding, US Army, Infantry Officer, (Retired)
How it all Began
The French Indochina federation was a grouping of French colonial territories formed on October 17, 1887, in Southeast Asia, and lasted until its demise in 1954. It included three Vietnamese regions of Tonkin in the north, Annam in the center, and Cochinchina in the south, Cambodia, Laos (from 1899) and the Chinese territory of Guangzhouwan (from 1898 until 1945). The capital for most of its history (1902-45) was Hanoi. The capital from 1887 to 1902 and again from 1945 to 1954 was Saigon. The French annexed Cochinchina and established a protectorate in Cambodia in 1862 and 1863 respectively. After the French took over northern Vietnam through the Tonkin campaign in 1887, the various protectorates were merged into one union. Two more entities were incorporated into the union: the Laotian protectorate and the Chinese territory of Guangzhouwan.
The French exploited the resources in the region during their rule, but they also contributed to improve the health and education system in the region. Nevertheless, deep divides remained between the natives and colonists, leading to sporadic rebellions by the latter. After the fall of France during World War II, the colony was administered by the Vichy government and was under Japanese occupation until March 1945, when the Japanese overthrew the colonial regime. When the Japanese surrendered in September 1945, the Viet Minh, a communist organization led by Ho Chi Minh, declared Vietnamese independence, but France subsequently took back control of French Indochina after the war ended. An all-out independence war, known as the First Indochina War, broke out in late 1946 between French and Viet Minh forces.
To counter the Viet Minh, the State of Vietnam, led by former Emperor Băo Dai, was proclaimed in 1949. French efforts to reunite Vietnam were unsuccessful. On October 22 and November 9, 1953, the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia proclaimed their respective independences. Following the Geneva Accord of 1954, the French withdrew from Vietnam, which had been split into two countries (until 1976), and French Indochina was no more.
The Role of the United States in the Vietnam War
The United States interest in Vietnam began after World War II and escalated into full commitment during the Vietnam War, from 1955 to 1973. The U.S. involvement in South Vietnam stemmed from a combination of factors: France’s long colonial history in French Indochina, the U.S. war with Japan in the Pacific, and both Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong’s pledge in 1950 to support Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh’s guerrilla forces.
Despite being concerned about Communist commitments to the Viet Minh, the U.S. was adamantly against providing any aid to France that would in any way prop up their struggle to maintain its pre-WWII colonial empire. However, Stalin and Mao’s offering their support to the Viet Minh in 1950 changed the battlefield dynamic and geopolitical character of the struggle to one of a global conflict against Maoist and Stalinist expansionism.
In September 1950, the U.S. began to moderately back the French. Beginning with $10 Million worth of military supplies, President Harry S. Truman, from that initial support, provided progressively increasing amounts of financial and military assistance to French forces fighting in what was still in the minds of the Western powers, French Indochina. Beginning in 1951, U.S. involvement increased from just assisting French forces to providing direct military assistance to the associated states (Annam, Tonkin, Laos, and Cambodia).
Eventually, U.S. missions were conducted at a more consistent rate by sending increasing amounts of military assistance. Their main intent was to restrict Communist expansion in Indochina as they thought it would soon lead to Communist takeovers in Thailand, Laos, Malaya, and all of what later became Vietnam (the so-called Domino Effect). This would have resulted in a change in the balance of power throughout Asia. The U.S. foreign policy establishment saw the U.S.’s national security and Western Europe’s interests being marginalized due to the rise of this Communist expansion, and thus it took steps it felt were necessary to restrict it.
Under Truman, the support increased from $10 million in September 1950 to $150 Million by the end of 1951. The struggle passed from Truman to President Eisenhower, who saw the fall of French Indochina, and in 1961 the Eisenhower administration passed the conflict to the Kennedy administration. In May 1961, Kennedy sent five hundred more military advisers, bringing American forces in Vietnam to 1,400. The budget increase, coupled with more advisors being sent to Vietnam, began to arouse concern within certain segments of the U.S. government and among the people of the United States.
The Vietnam War, also known as the Second Indochina War, was a conflict in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from November 1, 1955, to the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. It was officially fought between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. North Vietnam was supported by the Soviet Union, China, and other communist allies; South Vietnam was supported by the United States, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and other anti-communist nations. Ultimately, estimates of the number of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians killed vary from 966,000 to 3,812,000. Currently, records report that the conflict resulted in 58,318 U.S. fatalities though this number is likely to increase. (see footnote 1)
The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and its role in Vietnam
The 5th SFG(A) saw extensive action in the Vietnam War and played a pivotal role in the early months of the war. The 5th Group - as it is sometimes called - is designed to deploy and execute nine doctrinal missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, counterinsurgency, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, information operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and security force aid.
As of 2016, the 5th SFG (A) operated primarily within the CENTCOM area of responsibility as part of the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). The 5th SFG (A) specializes in operations in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa (HOA). The 5th SFG (A) and two of its battalions spend six months out of every twelve deployed to Iraq as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula. However, these commitments could change as U.S. troops are disengaging in that part of the world and focusing more attention on developing threats elsewhere.
Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the number of Special Forces advisers in Vietnam steadily increased. Their responsibility was to train South Vietnamese soldiers in the art of counterinsurgency and to mold various native tribes into a credible anti-communist threat.
Initially, elements from the different SF groups were involved in advising the South Vietnamese. In September 1964, the 5th SF Group was formed exclusively to conduct operations in Vietnam. The 5th SF Group set up its provisional headquarters in Nha Trang. Six months later, in February, Nha Trang became the 5th SF Group permanent headquarters. From that point on, all SF Soldiers in Vietnam were assigned to the 5th SF Group until 1971, when the group returned to Fort Bragg. However, a small number of 5th Group members were re-deployed to Thailand where they continued to conduct over-the-border operations into North Vietnam.
By the time the 5th SF Group left Southeast Asia, SF soldiers had earned 17 Medals of Honor, one Distinguished Service Medal, 90 Distinguished Service Crosses, 814 Silver Star Medals, 13,234 Bronze Star Medals, 235 Legions of Merit, 46 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 232 Soldier’s Medals, 4,891 Air Medals, 6,908 Army Commendation Medals and 2,658 Purple Hearts. It was a brilliant record, built on blood and sacrifice.
Not to be overlooked, other SF training teams were operating in the 1960s in Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. Southeast Asia, however, was the SF’s primary focus. Through their unstinting labors, SF troops eventually established 254 outposts throughout Vietnam, many of them defended by a single A-team and hundreds of friendly natives. But fighting in remote areas of Vietnam - publicity to the contrary - wasn’t the only mission of SF. It was also responsible for training thousands of Vietnam’s ethnic tribe members in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. SF took the Montagnard’s, the Nungs, the Cao Dei and others and molded them into the 60,000-strong Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). CIDG troops became the SF’s most valuable ally in battles fought in faraway corners of Vietnam, out of reach of conventional back-up forces.
Included amongst the 254 outposts are many that will be remembered whenever the dangers of A-Team duty on the borders of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are discussed. Names like Nam Dong, Lang Vei, Dak To, A Shau, Plei Mei, Dak Seang, Ben Het, and Dak Pek are places that will long be remembered in the lore of Special Forces operations in Vietnam. Those who kept the enemy at bay will never forget. Most will acknowledge that the North Vietnamese soldier and his Viet Cong counterpart were worthy opponents - tough, brave, and not afraid to stand and fight for their cause.
While the SF A-teams executed their missions around the nucleus of the outpost, other SF organizations conducted clandestine missions, the details of which are not as well known. A-Teams were involved with civic-action projects such as building schools, hospitals, and government buildings, and providing medical care to civilians.
Meanwhile, there was another side of the SF mission that was less focused on winning the hearts and minds of the people. SF personnel were instrumental in the covert war against North Vietnam. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - Studies and Observation Group, or MACV-SOG, conducted cross-border operations into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam to disrupt the enemy’s use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, while other SF-led teams ran-in-country long-range reconnaissance patrols under the Delta, Sigma and Omega projects.
Dak To and Ben Het Special Forces Camps.
During the final years of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Special Forces maintained six A-Camps along South Vietnam’s mountainous western border in the Central Highlands. Bu Prang, Duc Lap, Duc Co, Dak Pek, Dak Seang and Ben Het. These outposts would all see intense action as each was besieged by the NVA, who did little to hide their intentions for the camps.
The fighting at Ben Het was joined with the U.S. Army’s 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division which had moved to Dak To in 1967. Prior to the arrival of the 4th Infantry Division, other Army units had moved in and out of the Dak To area, usually in response to NVA buildups in the surrounding mountains. The most famous of these battles was the 173 Airborne Brigade’s battle for Hill 875, southwest of Dak To.
The Battle for Hill 875 was a 5-day engagement during the Battle of Dak To in Kontum province which took place during November 1967. At 09:43 on 19 November, three companies (330 men) of 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment moved into positions to assault Hill 875. Charlie and Delta companies moved up the slope followed by two platoons of Alpha Company in the classic "two up one back" formation utilized since World War I.
At 10:30, as the Americans moved to within three hundred meters of the crest, NVA machine gunners opened fire. They attempted to continue the advance, but the North Vietnamese, well concealed in interconnected bunkers and trenches, opened fire with small arms and grenades.
At 18:58 one of the worst friendly fire incidents of the Vietnam War occurred when a Marine Corps fighter-bomber dropped two 500-pound bombs into 2/503's perimeter. One of the bombs exploded in the trees above the center of the position, where the combined command groups, the wounded, and the medics were all located. It killed forty-two men outright and wounded forty-five more. In the end, the battle of Hill 875 had cost over one hundred American lives lost, over 250 wounded, and seven missing.
In early 1968, the SF A-Team located at Dak To relocated to Ben Het where they established an outpost on a barren mountaintop just six miles east of the point where Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam borders converge. Ben Het was strategically important because it was close to the Ho Chi Minh Trail which enabled SF reconnaissance operations to keep a close watch on NVA supply activities and troop movements.
Ben Het was supported by a 12-man SF A-team and some two hundred Montagnard tribe members. After moving to Ben Het, the SF A-team and their Montagnard’s worked diligently to make the camp defensible and create housing for the Montagnard families. By 1969, the outpost was well established and believed capable of defending themselves against the size of NVA units that infiltrated into South Vietnam in that area.
In early 1969, intelligence reports began to indicate that the NVA were planning a major offensive in the Central Highlands. Intelligence indicated that the NVA were equipped with tanks for the first time in the Vietnam war. In late February and early March, the camp placed anti-tank mines in the roads surrounding the camp in anticipation of the NVA using tanks.
On March 3rd, the NVA attacked the camp with almost 650 rounds of artillery followed by an Infantry ground assault against the west side of the camp by a battalion from the 66th NVA Regiment, supported by 10 PT-76 tanks.
The assault was directed at a point where a CIDG company was dug in and supported by several U.S. M-48 Patton tanks. The NVA tanks drove into the minefield and two were knocked out. Later during the battle, an American tank was hit, and two crew members killed. The camp managed to successfully defend itself and the NVA retreated when friendly reinforcements, known as the MIKE force, arrived to relieve the defenders. (see footnote 2)
As the 1969 monsoon season fell upon the area, the camps at Ben Het and Dak To were again besieged by the 28th and 66th NVA Regiments from late May until June 29th. The roads were cut in various places and the NVA assumed positions to fire on aircraft attempting to use the airstrip. Air resupply became a problem. Often, Air Force C-7 Caribou transport aircraft had to parachute their loads into the camp. For any aircraft attempting to land, a full saturation by ground support aircraft was needed to silence the gauntlet of ground fire. First, the hills surrounding Ben Het were softened up by A-1 fighter-bombers trying to make the North Vietnamese gunners keep their heads down. A Forward Air Controller (FAC) supervised the Caribous' approach, with a pair of Air Force F-4 Phantom fighter bombers stacked up to react on his call to any anti-aircraft fire. Planes dropped smoke just before the Caribous lined up for their final approach.
By late June, with the battle imminent, the C7-A Caribous could no longer land to unload. Supplies had to be airdropped. Two hundred tons of supplies arrived this way between June 10 and the end of the battle.
On June 23d, there was a serious probing attack that led to a three-hour firefight. One American was killed and a half-dozen more wounded. The NVA were estimated to have 1,500 to 2,000 troops in the immediate vicinity of the camp. They had dug trenches and tunnels under the north hill of the camp that went under all three barbed wire entanglements and reached the bunkers of the outer perimeter defenses. Note: The strategy of digging tunnels to approach an objective was used successfully by the NVA to defeat the French at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. They also used it at Khe Sanh to try to defeat the U.S. Marines. It did not work at Khe Sanh primarily due to the intensive bombing campaign that the U.S. waged around the clock. (see footnote 3)
The NVA used loudspeakers to attempt to get the CIDG to surrender. They broadcast messages in English and Vietnamese, then followed their message with a barrage of artillery and mortar shells. The U.S. countered with Air Force B-52 strikes that dropped 340 tons of bombs on the area surrounding the camp.
The NVA was broadcasting that Ben Het was the “Dien Bien Phu” for the American soldiers.
It was imperative that the roads to both Dak To and Kontum be reopened. The camp was running low on ammunition, especially illumination rounds. This was the first major test for the “Vietnamization” process for the U.S. pulling out and the ARVN troops taking over the defense of their country; the ammo resupply convoys had to get through.
The ARVN commander cleared the road around Dak To but needed considerable reinforcements to do so. He was augmented by four infantry battalions with half of the armor available in II Corps. The U.S. supported with a battery of 175mm guns along with a battalion of 105mm howitzers, a large amount of helicopter support as well as tactical air strikes and B-52 strikes.
The massive amount of firepower was brought to bear on the hills surrounding Ben Het and the once triple canopy jungle was stripped bare. But the NVA with their tunnels withstood most of it unscathed.
ARVN troops succeeded in getting a convoy over Road 512 from Dak To into Ben Het on June 24th, but it took heavy fighting most of the way to do so. Just outside of Ben Het, U.S. engineers clearing mines were ambushed by the NVA and suffered heavy casualties. The ARVN escort column for the engineers fled at the first shot.
Another convoy trying to make it into the camp was badly shot up. On June 27th, another company was tasked to air assault into the camp to help stem the tide. The NVA stepped up the artillery fire on the base, dropping 450 rounds into the camp, wounding nine Americans. The Americans countered with 60 B-52s that delivered 1,800 tons of bombs on NVA positions.
With the eyes of many watching the ARVN troops in their first real test on their own, they poured in troops to stop the NVA. At the peak of the battle, there were seven ARVN battalions joining the two American-led reinforcement battalions totaling close to 4,000 troops.
In the ensuing days, ARVN troop convoys continued to force their way down Rte. 512 and finally cleared the areas around Ben Het of NVA troops.
Although stopped at Ben Het, the NVA were not defeated. They faded back into the jungle as was their routine strategy when their opposition became too intense. In August, the same NVA regiments would siege the Special Forces camps at Bu Prang and Duc Lap.
By July 2d, the siege of Ben Het was declared over. The Ben Het camp was rebuilt and reinforced by engineers and all the bunkers strengthened.
Personnel losses during the battle included: one Special Forces Green Beret killed and sixteen wounded; one South Vietnamese Special Forces killed, and seven others wounded; 15 ARVN soldiers killed and seventy wounded; and 52 CIDG strikers killed and 141 wounded. There were twenty-three civilians killed and eleven wounded. Casualties among the U.S. artillery was high as well. NVA casualties were 183 killed around the Ben Het outpost in a series of firefights and 105 were killed northeast of Ben Het; most were killed by artillery.
The result was that the camp at Ben Het was powerless to stop the NVA from infiltrating from Cambodia along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The NVA were able to pin the CIDG strikers into the camp by siege and they couldn’t affect the NVA as envisioned.
However, the camp’s existence was a political victory (one of the few). The camp and the SF defenders had defeated every attempt to push them out, even when the NVA brought tanks into the wire.
While the U.S. Special Forces, artillerymen and armor troops fought a heck of a fight, it showed that the South Vietnamese, the ARVN, had a long way to go to being self-sufficient.
Dak To, Dak Seang, and Dak Pek Special Forces Camps.
During the final years of the U.S. Involvement in Vietnam, the Special Forces held onto six A-Camps along South Vietnam’s mountainous western border in the Central Highlands: Bu Prang, Duc Lap, Duc Co, Dak Seang, Ben Het, and Dak Pek.
Dak Pek Camp (also known as Dak Pek Special Forces Camp) was a former U.S. Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) base, located in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, about forty-five kilometers north of Dak To. The 5th Special Forces Group first established a base there in December 1962 to monitor communist infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
On 1 April 1970, the NVA attacked the camp, starting a siege that lasted until 8 May. At the same time the NVA attacked the Dak Pek Camp, the NVA also laid siege to the SF camp at Dak Seang, about twenty kilometers south of Dak Pek. On 15 April 1970, in response to the siege of Dak Seang, the 170th Assault Helicopter Company dropped the 3rd Battalion, 42nd ARVN Regiment into a nearby landing zone, losing two helicopters in the operation. Three days earlier, In the early hours of April 12, 1970, the NVA attacked the Special Forces A-team camp at Dak Pek, seizing more than half the base - including the high ground and some crew-served weapons - plus the surrounding valley and mountains.
The Aftermath for the 5th Special Forces (Airborne).
During America’s long war in Vietnam, many of the Green Berets who fought there became legends within the Special Forces Regiment. And among those warriors were the men of MACVSOG (Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group); the SOG warriors were among the finest the country has ever produced.
Major General George "Speedy" Gaspard.
Major General George "Speedy" Gaspard was one of the most well-known and respected officers from that generation. After serving with the Marine Corps in World War II, Gaspard joined the Army. He was an original, volunteering for the newly formed 10th Special Forces Group and attending Special Forces Class #1. He would run cross border operations in the Korean War, but really made his mark during the war in Vietnam, working in Special Forces A-Camps as well as running some of the most secret operations across the border into North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
George Wallace Gaspard Jr. was born at Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Ala., on August 5, 1926. He was the son of the late George W. Gaspard of MN, and Annie Lou Bamberg of AL.
He served in the United States Marine Corps from 1944 to 1946 and fought in the final battle of World War II on the island of Okinawa with the 6th Marine Division. He first entered the U.S. Army on June 11, 1951.
In May 1952, Gaspard was a student in the first all-officer class at the Ranger course. He then attended a special course at the Air Ground School located at Southern Pines, N.C. Afterward, he volunteered for the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), which had just been organized at Fort Bragg, N.C.
His first assignment was as a team leader of the 18th SF Operational Detachment. In November 1952, he attended Special Forces Class #1. The fledgling Special Forces unit, much of it comprised of World War II vets from the OSS, was anxious to get involved in the Korean War and conduct missions like those conducted in occupied areas of Europe and the Pacific during the war.
The SF troops were put in an active intelligence operation that utilized Tactical Liaison Offices (TLO). Although only anti-communist Koreans initially staffed them, the TLO would eventually conduct “line-crossing operations” which included using Chinese agents to gather intelligence on the enemy. However, the Far East Command (FEC) assigned the SF troops as individual replacements rather than as 15-man A-Teams that SF was employing at the time, using the OSS WWII Operational Group model.
In March 1953, then 1Lt. Gaspard was assigned to FEC/LD 8240AU FECOM. He commanded four soldiers and 80 South Korean agents, who were dispatched behind enemy lines to gather intelligence on the North Koreans. Obviously, the threat of double agents, something that would later haunt SOG operations in Vietnam, loomed. Gaspard was awarded the Silver Star and Bronze Star for actions in combat during June 11-12, 1953.
In October 1954, Gaspard joined the 77th SF Group (A) as a guerrilla warfare instructor with the Psychological Warfare School’s Special Forces Department. He was subsequently transferred to the 187th ARCT and honorably discharged in September 1957.
From 1960 to 1962, he served as a civilian mobilization designee with the Special Warfare department in the Pentagon. In April 1962, he was recalled to active duty and assigned to the 5th SF Group (A) at Fort Bragg, commanding Det A-13. In September, he opened a new Special Forces Camp in Kontum Province at Dak Pek, Vietnam, which remained the longest continuously active SF/ARVN Ranger camp until it was overrun in 1972. That would be the first of seven tours of duty in Vietnam for Gaspard.
During the early days of Vietnam, there was a general lack of accurate reporting by the press on the fighting. However, there were a handful of reporters who were willing to walk in the field and endure combat with the troops. One of those was Pulitzer Prize-winning author and reporter David Halberstam. He was a special correspondent with the New York Times and not a wire reporter, so he had the time to visit the troops and share a much closer look at what was truly transpiring on the ground.
Major General George “Speedy” Gaspard
One of the first people that Halberstam met in Vietnam was Speedy Gaspard. The two developed a friendship and Gaspard became a source of what was really happening in the outlying areas of Vietnam where SF was working by, with, and through the locals. Halberstam was so taken by Gaspard that he modeled the lead character of his war novel “One Very Hot Day” after him.
Captain Gaspard returned to Fort Bragg in 1963 as adjutant and HHC commander of the newly formed 6th SF Group (A). In July 1965, he reported to AID Washington, DC, and subsequently to AID Saigon, where he was assigned as a provincial adviser in Quang Duc Province. He was instrumental in the very tricky negotiations to peacefully transfer FULRO personnel (Front Uni de Lutte des Races Opprimées — United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races) to the Army of South Vietnam.
FULRO was comprised of the indigenous people of the Central Highlands of Vietnam (Montagnards). The lowland Vietnamese hated them, both in South and North Vietnam, and referred to them as “moi” (savages). At the time, Vietnamese books characterized Montagnards as having excessive body hair and long tails. The Vietnamese rarely ventured into Montagnard regions until after the French colonial rule. Then, they built several profitable plantations to grow crops in, and extract natural resources from, those bountiful areas.
The simple mountain people were excellent hunters and trackers. They immediately bonded with the Green Berets assigned to stop the communist infiltration of South Vietnam and the Green Berets responded in kind. SF set up the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), which trained and led the Montagnards in Unconventional Warfare against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.
But the South Vietnamese government never trusted and hated the CIDG program because it feared the Montagnard people would want independence. (Such was their hatred for the Vietnamese that the Montagnards would continue to fight a guerrilla war against unified Vietnam for 20 years after the war ended. There were reports of genocide against the mountain people and over 200,000 died during the fight.)
Gaspard was promoted to major in 1966, and after completing his tour, reported to 1st SF Group (A), Okinawa. In October 1967, he returned to Vietnam and directed the MACVSOG “STRATA” program until September 1968.
The commanders in Vietnam, especially among the SOG personnel, were never satisfied with the intelligence collection activities conducted in North Vietnam. STRATA was conceived to aid the Intelligence situation by focusing on short-term intelligence-gathering operations close to the border. The all-Vietnamese Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition teams would report on activities across the border and then be recovered to be used again. Gaspard and the SOG Commander, Col. Jack Singlaub, briefed Gen. Westmoreland and Gen. Abrams on STRATA operations.
Once, a STRATA team became surrounded and required emergency extraction. Gaspard, riding a hydraulic penetrator, twice descended to remove a wounded agent. He was subsequently awarded the Air Force Distinguished Flying Cross for Heroism and the Purple Heart Medal for his actions.
Moles inside South Vietnam’s government and military, even in SOG, were a constant source of leaks to the North, even in SOG. Some of these leaks became known much later. However, Gaspard would remedy that. As written in a fantastic piece by SOG team member John Stryker Meyer, Gaspard moved the operations jump-off location out of South Vietnam and the intelligence leaks began to dry up.
“The unique aspect of STRATA, which operated under OP34B, the teams launched out of Thailand, flying in Air Force helicopters. The Air Force performed all insertions and extractions without pre-mission reports to Saigon” (Now, Ho Chi Minh City)”.
During Gaspard’s tenure at STRATA, 24 teams were inserted into North Vietnam on various intelligence-gathering missions. Only one and a half teams were lost during that period that involved inserting and successfully extracting more than 150 STRATA team members during that time.”
“Again, a key part to our success was having our separate chain of command and not telling Saigon. We worked with the Air Force on a need-to-know basis.”
It wasn’t until many years later that Gaspard realized the extent of the communist infiltration of the south, right into SOG headquarters. Meyer describes in his piece the horror felt when someone close to the Americans, someone who had been vetted, was in fact a spy for the enemy.
“During a 1996 Hanoi television show, Maj. Gen. George “Speedy” Gaspard, was shocked when he saw an individual he knew as “Francois” receive Hanoi’s highest military honor for his years of service as a spy in SOG. Gaspard, who had several tours of duty in Vietnam and in SOG, knew “Francois” and was “shocked” when he saw the program. Francois had access to highly sensitive information while employed by the U.S.”
Author and SOG recon man John L. Plaster, has a photo of Gaspard standing with Francois in Saigon when Gaspard had no idea of the spy’s real role for the NVA. That photograph of Gaspard and Francois is on Page 463 of Plaster’s book: SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars, by Paladin Press Book.
“There’s no question that he hurt SOG operations,” Gaspard said. “Again, how do you gauge it all? When you look at the success rate of STRATA teams by comparison, you can see why they succeeded. We were disconnected from Saigon, and we didn’t have the NVA and Russians working against us.”
Gaspard returned to SOG in 1969 and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1971. He reported to 1st SF Group, Okinawa as the group executive officer, and later assumed command of the 1st Battalion. He retired in August 1973 after having served in three wars.
His earned multiple awards and decorations including the Silver Star Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with V-device and five Oak Leaf Clusters, Air Medal with V-device and three Oak Leaf Clusters, Purple Heart Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Combat Infantryman’s Badge with one Battle Star, Master Parachutist Badge, Pacific Theater Service Ribbon with one Campaign Star, Korea Service Ribbon with two campaign Stars, Vietnam Service Campaign Ribbon with 15 Campaign Stars, 18 other service and foreign awards including the Vietnamese Gallantry Cross with Gold, Silver and Bronze stars, U.S. Navy Parachute Wings, Korea Master Parachutist Wings, Vietnamese Master Parachutist Wings, Thailand Master Parachutist Wings, and Cambodia Parachute Wings.
LTC Gaspard was a member of SFA, SOA, VFW, MOAA, American Legion, and the Sons of Confederacy.
From 2004 to 2017 Speedy served as president, vice president, or secretary of the Chapter XXI President of the Special Forces Association. (The Chapter provided a lot of Gaspard’s personal biography listed here.)
In 1985, Colonel Gaspard entered the South Carolina State Guard and in 1987 was appointed Chief of Staff with the rank of Brigadier General. In 1991, he was inducted into the Officer Candidate School Hall of Fame at Fort Benning, Georgia.
In the early fall of 1989, when I was a student in the SF Officer's course at Ft. Bragg, one of our fellow students was a young man named George Gaspard, the son of Speedy. Young George, whom we knew as “Buck” was an outstanding officer and an even better man who was very popular among the officers in the class.
We learned that General Speedy Gaspard was going to address our class. He first showed us an outstanding slideshow of pics he took while conducting some hair-raising missions with SOG. They were better than anything we had seen in any book or magazine. He then addressed the class in his self-effacing style and said: “standing before you is an old, fat man, but in Vietnam, I was an old, fat captain… but I relied on and surrounded myself with outstanding SF NCOs who made me look brilliant.”
He encouraged the future A-Team commanders to trust in their team sergeants and NCOs and they’d never be steered wrong. SF NCOs, he said, were the true leaders of Special Forces and officers need to realize it, work together, and take care of NCOs. Of course, sitting in the rear of the classroom was General David Baratto commander of the Special Warfare Center and School (SWC), who cringed a bit at those pointed comments.
Sitting in the back, my buddy Wade Chapple and I were stealing glances at General Baratto who looked pained… In a typical Chapple bit of sarcasm, he leaned over and said to me, “I think his (Baratto’s) head is about to f***ing explode.”
After the day was over, our entire class, including many of our instructors, joined Speedy Gaspard at the “O-Club” for a cocktail or three. He regaled us with some cool stories about the SF and SOG guys he served with. It was a memorable night. When we left that night, he made everyone feel that we knew him well. It was an honor to have met him.
LTC George “Speedy” Gaspard passed away on January 30, 2018.
Footnote 1: Vietnam War Accounting
Since 1973, the remains of more than 1,000 Americans killed in the Vietnam War have been identified and returned to their families for burial with full military honors.
For more than two decades the U.S. has conducted joint field activities with the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to recover the remains of missing Americans. Throughout these countries, field teams continue to investigate crash and burial sites, as well as interview locals to gain more knowledge. The U.S. also continues to obtain access to historical wartime records and archives that provide information relevant to the fates of missing Americans.
Today, more than 1,500 Americans are still unaccounted for from the conflict. Immediately after the Paris Peace Accords were signed on Jan. 27, 1973, Operation Homecoming returned 591 prisoners of war who had been captured in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (two Vietnam POWs and a Cold War POW were released from China). Some families and government officials expected a greater number of returnees, which gave rise to the urgency of the accounting mission. Although Article Eight of the Accord called for mutual assistance among the parties in accounting for the missing Americans, immediate postwar hostilities limited access to many sites. In 1973, the U.S. listed 2,646 Americans as unaccounted for from the war, with roughly equal numbers of those missing in action, or killed in action/body not recovered.
From February 1973 to March 1975, teams from the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam conducted joint, but restricted searches for Americans missing in South Vietnam. These searches met with limited success, recovering and identifying sixty-three servicemembers, twenty-three of whom had died in captivity in North Vietnam, and five of whom had been killed in Laos. On Dec. 15, 1973, U.S. Army Capt. Richard M. Rees was killed by guerrilla fighters while conducting search efforts, which caused restrictions of the ongoing recovery work. On April 30, 1975, searches ended completely when the Communists took over Vietnam.
In the 1980s, the U.S. resumed its recovery efforts with high-level policy and technical meetings. Then in August 1987, President Ronald Reagan dispatched Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr. as a Special Presidential Emissary on POW/MIA issues to find ways to account for those still missing from the war. As a result of the Vessey meetings, the Vietnamese allowed American teams to search throughout the country starting in September 1988. Parallel arrangements were reached in Laos and Cambodia around the same time and occasional targeted investigations were done in China. Continuous joint searches began in April 1988 in Laos, and in October 1991 in Cambodia.
In February 1992, the U.S. organized its accounting efforts into the large-scale field operations which continue today. Teams work during several periods each year in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, alongside their foreign counterparts. They have interviewed thousands of witnesses and conducted archival research in all three countries about the fate of missing Americans, resulting in the discovery of crash and burial sites across the region. Archeologists and anthropologists use meticulous site exploitation to find remains and material evidence, followed by a forensic process that often leads to the identification of our missing service members.
Footnote 2: The Mobile Strike Force Command, or MIKE Force
MIKE Force was a key component of United States Army Special Forces in the Vietnam War. They served with indigenous soldiers selected and trained through the largely minority Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and were led by American SF and Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) personnel. MIKE Force was a force multiplier, operating what is today called a Foreign Internal Defense mission.
United States Army Special Forces had been in South Vietnam since 1957; by 1964, over 1400 Green Berets were in-country, with its group headquarters at Nha Trang. Their primary mission was to train and advise CIDG groups, many of whom were hostile to Viet Cong (VC) efforts to promote socialist revolution in the countryside. In late 1964, increasingly intense Communist activity in the III Corps South Vietnam area, the area surrounding Saigon, established the need for CIDGs with more mobile capabilities, able to move to encampments and villages under VC attack. The first MIKE force, named for Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Miguel de la Pena, who supervised its creation, was initially principally composed of Nung people, an ethnic group which had migrated from southern China in the 300s AD.
The moniker “MIKE Force” later came to be applied to other Special Forces-trained mobile forces that operated throughout South Vietnam. These MIKE Force organizations were composed of Bahnar, Hmong, Nung, Jarai, and Khmer Krom minorities, and other members of the Degar peoples, also known as Montagnards. MIKE Force was active under MACV, Army Special Forces, from 1964 to 1970 and under ARVN until 1974. MIKE Force waged special warfare against the Viet Minh, Viet Cong and People’s Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese Army) forces in various detachments, volunteering in support of MIKE Force missions.
MIKE Force’s mission was to act as a country-wide quick reaction force for securing, reinforcing, and recapturing CIDG A Camps, as well as to conduct special reconnaissance patrols. Search and rescue and search and destroy RT missions were also assigned. The conventional unit alternative to Special Forces detachments like MIKE was Tiger Force, which was primarily tasked with counter-guerrilla warfare against enemies from behind their lines that emphasized body-count rather than force multiplication.
MIKE Force Nungs manned Hurricane Aircat airboats in the Mekong Delta under American Special Forces command starting in late 1966. One base was at the A-414 SF camp in Moc Hoa just south of the Cambodian border. There was an accidental incursion into Cambodia on November 20, 1966 involving these airboats, helicopter insertion of South Vietnamese troops and PACVs (hovercraft) that resulted in the deaths of 56 communist soldiers caught by surprise in the open. General Abrams arrived the following day for a debriefing. The King of Cambodia objected a week later.
MIKE Force had a critical role in the search and rescue of downed American pilots because they were mobile and often in close proximity to the DMZ. MIKE Force also designated drop zones and landing zones, conducted bomb-damage assessments, called in air strikes on high-value targets, and collected intelligence during recons, much like the American LRRPs.
In 1971 MIKE Force was disbanded after Vietnamization.
Footnote 3: NVA Tunnels at Dien Bien Phu
General Navarre, the French commander in Vietnam, realized that time was running out and that he needed to obtain a quick victory over the Viet Minh. He was convinced that if he could maneuver General Vo Nguyen Giap into engaging in a large-scale battle, France was bound to win. In December 1953, General Navarre setup a defensive complex at Dien Bien Phu, which would block the route of the Vietminh forces trying to return to camps in neighboring Laos. Navarre surmised that to reestablish the route to Laos, General Giap would be forced to organize a mass-attack on the French forces at Dien Bien Phu.
Navarre's plan worked and General Giap accepted the French challenge. However, instead of making a massive frontal assault, Giap choose to surround Dien Bien Phu and ordered his men to dig a trench that encircled the French troops. From the outer trench, other trenches and tunnels were dug inwards towards the center. The Vietminh were now able to move in close on the French troops defending Dien Bien Phu.
While these preparations were going on, Giap brought up members of the Vietminh from all over Vietnam. By the time the battle was ready to start, Giap had 70,000 soldiers surrounding Dien Bien Phu, five times the number of French troops enclosed within.
Employing recently obtained anti-aircraft guns and howitzers from China, Giap was able to restrict severely the ability of the French to supply their forces in Dien Bien Phu. When Navarre realized that he was trapped, he appealed for help. The United States was approached, and some advisers suggested the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Viet Minh. Another suggestion was that conventional air-raids would be enough to scatter Giap's troops.
The United States President, Dwight Eisenhower, however, refused to intervene unless he could persuade Britain and his other western allies to participate. Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, declined claiming that he wanted to wait for the outcome of the peace negotiations taking place in Geneva before becoming involved in escalating the war.
On March 13, 1954, Vo Nguyen Giap launched his offensive. For fifty-six days the Viet Minh pushed the French forces back until they only occupied a small area of Dien Bien Phu. Colonel Piroth, the artillery commander, blamed himself for the tactics that had been employed and after telling his fellow officers that he had been "completely dishonored" committed suicide by pulling the safety pin out of a grenade.
The French surrendered on May 7th. French casualties totaled over 7,000 and a further 11,000 soldiers were taken prisoner. The following day the French government announced that it intended to withdraw from Vietnam.
More information.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United States in the Vietnam War
Dak To and Ben Het Special Forces Camps.
www.specialforcesbooks.com/A244.html
The Dak To area was the scene of heavy fighting by the 4th Infantry Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade in 1967 and by the II CTZ Mike Force in 1969. The camp was moved further west to Ben Het in January 1968 and the Dak To camp was closed o/a 5/15/68. It was converted for use by the 95th Border Rangers on or about 12/31/70. Dak To and Ben Het were both located in Dak To District, Kontum Province.
Veteran Tributes.
www.veterantributes.org/TributeDetail.php?recordID=178
Here you will find a description of the action seen by Col. Artice Elliot during the fighting at Dak Seang in 1970. An excerpt: "During this period, the 3d Battalion was engaged in combat with elements of the 28th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in the vicinity of Dak Seang Special Forces Camp. Despite heavy direct and indirect fire weapons barrages at the onset of each attack, he would move to a position where he could direct air strikes, gunships, and artillery strikes, disregarding his own safety.".
Vietnam maps and locations of US Army firebases.
https://15thfar.org/maproom.html
YB 895-406 DAK SEANG AF 23km NW Dak To AF, “Ranger Camp”
YB 935-188 FIRE BASE 6 Hill 1001 7km NW Hill 1338 .
YB 989-152 HILL 1338 6km SSW Dak To II .
ZB 060-220 TAN CANH Inter/Sect. QL 14 & Rte. 512 to Ben Het.
ZB 043-225 DAK TO & Spec. Forces Camp “New” 42km NW Kontum.
ZB 013-213 DAK TO Spec. Forces Camp “Old”
Dak Pek Camp - Wikipedia
The PAVN simultaneously attacked the nearby Dak Seang Camp.
Other units based at Dak Pek included:
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery
57th Assault Helicopter Company
1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery.
The base was transferred to the 88th Border Rangers on 30 November 1970. In April 1972 AC-119K gunships killed 98 PAVN around Dak Pek.
Major General George “Speedy” Gaspard.
More information and pictures about the distinguished career of General Gaspard can be found on the many blogs published on the internet under his name.
Captain Gaspard returned to Fort Bragg in 1963 as adjutant and HHC commander of the newly formed 6th SF Group (A). In July 1965, he reported to AID Washington, DC, and subsequently to AID Saigon, where he was assigned as a provincial adviser in Quang Duc Province. He was instrumental in the very tricky negotiations to peacefully transfer FULRO personnel (Front Uni de Lutte des Races Opprimées — United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races) to the Army of South Vietnam.
FULRO was comprised of the indigenous people of the Central Highlands of Vietnam (Montagnards). The lowland Vietnamese hated them, both in South and North Vietnam, and referred to them as “moi” (savages). At the time, Vietnamese books characterized Montagnards as having excessive body hair and long tails. The Vietnamese rarely ventured into Montagnard regions until after the French colonial rule. Then, they built several profitable plantations to grow crops in, and extract natural resources from, those bountiful areas.
The simple mountain people were excellent hunters and trackers. They immediately bonded with the Green Berets assigned to stop the communist infiltration of South Vietnam and the Green Berets responded in kind. SF set up the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), which trained and led the Montagnards in Unconventional Warfare against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.
But the South Vietnamese government never trusted and hated the CIDG program because it feared the Montagnard people would want independence. (Such was their hatred for the Vietnamese that the Montagnards would continue to fight a guerrilla war against unified Vietnam for 20 years after the war ended. There were reports of genocide against the mountain people and over 200,000 died during the fight.)
Gaspard was promoted to major in 1966, and after completing his tour, reported to 1st SF Group (A), Okinawa. In October 1967, he returned to Vietnam and directed the MACVSOG “STRATA” program until September 1968.
The commanders in Vietnam, especially among the SOG personnel, were never satisfied with the intelligence collection activities conducted in North Vietnam. STRATA was conceived to aid the Intelligence situation by focusing on short-term intelligence-gathering operations close to the border. The all-Vietnamese Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition teams would report on activities across the border and then be recovered to be used again. Gaspard and the SOG Commander, Col. Jack Singlaub, briefed Gen. Westmoreland and Gen. Abrams on STRATA operations.
Once, a STRATA team became surrounded and required emergency extraction. Gaspard, riding a hydraulic penetrator, twice descended to remove a wounded agent. He was subsequently awarded the Air Force Distinguished Flying Cross for Heroism and the Purple Heart Medal for his actions.
Moles inside South Vietnam’s government and military, even in SOG, were a constant source of leaks to the North, even in SOG. Some of these leaks became known much later. However, Gaspard would remedy that. As written in a fantastic piece by SOG team member John Stryker Meyer, Gaspard moved the operations jump-off location out of South Vietnam and the intelligence leaks began to dry up.
“The unique aspect of STRATA, which operated under OP34B, the teams launched out of Thailand, flying in Air Force helicopters. The Air Force performed all insertions and extractions without pre-mission reports to Saigon” (Now, Ho Chi Minh City)”.
During Gaspard’s tenure at STRATA, 24 teams were inserted into North Vietnam on various intelligence-gathering missions. Only one and a half teams were lost during that period that involved inserting and successfully extracting more than 150 STRATA team members during that time.”
“Again, a key part to our success was having our separate chain of command and not telling Saigon. We worked with the Air Force on a need-to-know basis.”
It wasn’t until many years later that Gaspard realized the extent of the communist infiltration of the south, right into SOG headquarters. Meyer describes in his piece the horror felt when someone close to the Americans, someone who had been vetted, was in fact a spy for the enemy.
“During a 1996 Hanoi television show, Maj. Gen. George “Speedy” Gaspard, was shocked when he saw an individual he knew as “Francois” receive Hanoi’s highest military honor for his years of service as a spy in SOG. Gaspard, who had several tours of duty in Vietnam and in SOG, knew “Francois” and was “shocked” when he saw the program. Francois had access to highly sensitive information while employed by the U.S.”
Author and SOG recon man John L. Plaster, has a photo of Gaspard standing with Francois in Saigon when Gaspard had no idea of the spy’s real role for the NVA. That photograph of Gaspard and Francois is on Page 463 of Plaster’s book: SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars, by Paladin Press Book.
“There’s no question that he hurt SOG operations,” Gaspard said. “Again, how do you gauge it all? When you look at the success rate of STRATA teams by comparison, you can see why they succeeded. We were disconnected from Saigon, and we didn’t have the NVA and Russians working against us.”
Gaspard returned to SOG in 1969 and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1971. He reported to 1st SF Group, Okinawa as the group executive officer, and later assumed command of the 1st Battalion. He retired in August 1973 after having served in three wars.
His earned multiple awards and decorations including the Silver Star Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with V-device and five Oak Leaf Clusters, Air Medal with V-device and three Oak Leaf Clusters, Purple Heart Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Combat Infantryman’s Badge with one Battle Star, Master Parachutist Badge, Pacific Theater Service Ribbon with one Campaign Star, Korea Service Ribbon with two campaign Stars, Vietnam Service Campaign Ribbon with 15 Campaign Stars, 18 other service and foreign awards including the Vietnamese Gallantry Cross with Gold, Silver and Bronze stars, U.S. Navy Parachute Wings, Korea Master Parachutist Wings, Vietnamese Master Parachutist Wings, Thailand Master Parachutist Wings, and Cambodia Parachute Wings.
LTC Gaspard was a member of SFA, SOA, VFW, MOAA, American Legion, and the Sons of Confederacy.
From 2004 to 2017 Speedy served as president, vice president, or secretary of the Chapter XXI President of the Special Forces Association. (The Chapter provided a lot of Gaspard’s personal biography listed here.)
In 1985, Colonel Gaspard entered the South Carolina State Guard and in 1987 was appointed Chief of Staff with the rank of Brigadier General. In 1991, he was inducted into the Officer Candidate School Hall of Fame at Fort Benning, Georgia.
In the early fall of 1989, when I was a student in the SF Officer's course at Ft. Bragg, one of our fellow students was a young man named George Gaspard, the son of Speedy. Young George, whom we knew as “Buck” was an outstanding officer and an even better man who was very popular among the officers in the class.
We learned that General Speedy Gaspard was going to address our class. He first showed us an outstanding slideshow of pics he took while conducting some hair-raising missions with SOG. They were better than anything we had seen in any book or magazine. He then addressed the class in his self-effacing style and said: “standing before you is an old, fat man, but in Vietnam, I was an old, fat captain… but I relied on and surrounded myself with outstanding SF NCOs who made me look brilliant.”
He encouraged the future A-Team commanders to trust in their team sergeants and NCOs and they’d never be steered wrong. SF NCOs, he said, were the true leaders of Special Forces and officers need to realize it, work together, and take care of NCOs. Of course, sitting in the rear of the classroom was General David Baratto commander of the Special Warfare Center and School (SWC), who cringed a bit at those pointed comments.
Sitting in the back, my buddy Wade Chapple and I were stealing glances at General Baratto who looked pained… In a typical Chapple bit of sarcasm, he leaned over and said to me, “I think his (Baratto’s) head is about to f***ing explode.”
After the day was over, our entire class, including many of our instructors, joined Speedy Gaspard at the “O-Club” for a cocktail or three. He regaled us with some cool stories about the SF and SOG guys he served with. It was a memorable night. When we left that night, he made everyone feel that we knew him well. It was an honor to have met him.
LTC George “Speedy” Gaspard passed away on January 30, 2018.
Footnote 1: Vietnam War Accounting
Since 1973, the remains of more than 1,000 Americans killed in the Vietnam War have been identified and returned to their families for burial with full military honors.
For more than two decades the U.S. has conducted joint field activities with the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to recover the remains of missing Americans. Throughout these countries, field teams continue to investigate crash and burial sites, as well as interview locals to gain more knowledge. The U.S. also continues to obtain access to historical wartime records and archives that provide information relevant to the fates of missing Americans.
Today, more than 1,500 Americans are still unaccounted for from the conflict. Immediately after the Paris Peace Accords were signed on Jan. 27, 1973, Operation Homecoming returned 591 prisoners of war who had been captured in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (two Vietnam POWs and a Cold War POW were released from China). Some families and government officials expected a greater number of returnees, which gave rise to the urgency of the accounting mission. Although Article Eight of the Accord called for mutual assistance among the parties in accounting for the missing Americans, immediate postwar hostilities limited access to many sites. In 1973, the U.S. listed 2,646 Americans as unaccounted for from the war, with roughly equal numbers of those missing in action, or killed in action/body not recovered.
From February 1973 to March 1975, teams from the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam conducted joint, but restricted searches for Americans missing in South Vietnam. These searches met with limited success, recovering and identifying sixty-three servicemembers, twenty-three of whom had died in captivity in North Vietnam, and five of whom had been killed in Laos. On Dec. 15, 1973, U.S. Army Capt. Richard M. Rees was killed by guerrilla fighters while conducting search efforts, which caused restrictions of the ongoing recovery work. On April 30, 1975, searches ended completely when the Communists took over Vietnam.
In the 1980s, the U.S. resumed its recovery efforts with high-level policy and technical meetings. Then in August 1987, President Ronald Reagan dispatched Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr. as a Special Presidential Emissary on POW/MIA issues to find ways to account for those still missing from the war. As a result of the Vessey meetings, the Vietnamese allowed American teams to search throughout the country starting in September 1988. Parallel arrangements were reached in Laos and Cambodia around the same time and occasional targeted investigations were done in China. Continuous joint searches began in April 1988 in Laos, and in October 1991 in Cambodia.
In February 1992, the U.S. organized its accounting efforts into the large-scale field operations which continue today. Teams work during several periods each year in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, alongside their foreign counterparts. They have interviewed thousands of witnesses and conducted archival research in all three countries about the fate of missing Americans, resulting in the discovery of crash and burial sites across the region. Archeologists and anthropologists use meticulous site exploitation to find remains and material evidence, followed by a forensic process that often leads to the identification of our missing service members.
Footnote 2: The Mobile Strike Force Command, or MIKE Force
MIKE Force was a key component of United States Army Special Forces in the Vietnam War. They served with indigenous soldiers selected and trained through the largely minority Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and were led by American SF and Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) personnel. MIKE Force was a force multiplier, operating what is today called a Foreign Internal Defense mission.
United States Army Special Forces had been in South Vietnam since 1957; by 1964, over 1400 Green Berets were in-country, with its group headquarters at Nha Trang. Their primary mission was to train and advise CIDG groups, many of whom were hostile to Viet Cong (VC) efforts to promote socialist revolution in the countryside. In late 1964, increasingly intense Communist activity in the III Corps South Vietnam area, the area surrounding Saigon, established the need for CIDGs with more mobile capabilities, able to move to encampments and villages under VC attack. The first MIKE force, named for Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Miguel de la Pena, who supervised its creation, was initially principally composed of Nung people, an ethnic group which had migrated from southern China in the 300s AD.
The moniker “MIKE Force” later came to be applied to other Special Forces-trained mobile forces that operated throughout South Vietnam. These MIKE Force organizations were composed of Bahnar, Hmong, Nung, Jarai, and Khmer Krom minorities, and other members of the Degar peoples, also known as Montagnards. MIKE Force was active under MACV, Army Special Forces, from 1964 to 1970 and under ARVN until 1974. MIKE Force waged special warfare against the Viet Minh, Viet Cong and People’s Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese Army) forces in various detachments, volunteering in support of MIKE Force missions.
MIKE Force’s mission was to act as a country-wide quick reaction force for securing, reinforcing, and recapturing CIDG A Camps, as well as to conduct special reconnaissance patrols. Search and rescue and search and destroy RT missions were also assigned. The conventional unit alternative to Special Forces detachments like MIKE was Tiger Force, which was primarily tasked with counter-guerrilla warfare against enemies from behind their lines that emphasized body-count rather than force multiplication.
MIKE Force Nungs manned Hurricane Aircat airboats in the Mekong Delta under American Special Forces command starting in late 1966. One base was at the A-414 SF camp in Moc Hoa just south of the Cambodian border. There was an accidental incursion into Cambodia on November 20, 1966 involving these airboats, helicopter insertion of South Vietnamese troops and PACVs (hovercraft) that resulted in the deaths of 56 communist soldiers caught by surprise in the open. General Abrams arrived the following day for a debriefing. The King of Cambodia objected a week later.
MIKE Force had a critical role in the search and rescue of downed American pilots because they were mobile and often in close proximity to the DMZ. MIKE Force also designated drop zones and landing zones, conducted bomb-damage assessments, called in air strikes on high-value targets, and collected intelligence during recons, much like the American LRRPs.
In 1971 MIKE Force was disbanded after Vietnamization.
Footnote 3: NVA Tunnels at Dien Bien Phu
General Navarre, the French commander in Vietnam, realized that time was running out and that he needed to obtain a quick victory over the Viet Minh. He was convinced that if he could maneuver General Vo Nguyen Giap into engaging in a large-scale battle, France was bound to win. In December 1953, General Navarre setup a defensive complex at Dien Bien Phu, which would block the route of the Vietminh forces trying to return to camps in neighboring Laos. Navarre surmised that to reestablish the route to Laos, General Giap would be forced to organize a mass-attack on the French forces at Dien Bien Phu.
Navarre's plan worked and General Giap accepted the French challenge. However, instead of making a massive frontal assault, Giap choose to surround Dien Bien Phu and ordered his men to dig a trench that encircled the French troops. From the outer trench, other trenches and tunnels were dug inwards towards the center. The Vietminh were now able to move in close on the French troops defending Dien Bien Phu.
While these preparations were going on, Giap brought up members of the Vietminh from all over Vietnam. By the time the battle was ready to start, Giap had 70,000 soldiers surrounding Dien Bien Phu, five times the number of French troops enclosed within.
Employing recently obtained anti-aircraft guns and howitzers from China, Giap was able to restrict severely the ability of the French to supply their forces in Dien Bien Phu. When Navarre realized that he was trapped, he appealed for help. The United States was approached, and some advisers suggested the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Viet Minh. Another suggestion was that conventional air-raids would be enough to scatter Giap's troops.
The United States President, Dwight Eisenhower, however, refused to intervene unless he could persuade Britain and his other western allies to participate. Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, declined claiming that he wanted to wait for the outcome of the peace negotiations taking place in Geneva before becoming involved in escalating the war.
On March 13, 1954, Vo Nguyen Giap launched his offensive. For fifty-six days the Viet Minh pushed the French forces back until they only occupied a small area of Dien Bien Phu. Colonel Piroth, the artillery commander, blamed himself for the tactics that had been employed and after telling his fellow officers that he had been "completely dishonored" committed suicide by pulling the safety pin out of a grenade.
The French surrendered on May 7th. French casualties totaled over 7,000 and a further 11,000 soldiers were taken prisoner. The following day the French government announced that it intended to withdraw from Vietnam.
More information.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United States in the Vietnam War
Dak To and Ben Het Special Forces Camps.
www.specialforcesbooks.com/A244.html
The Dak To area was the scene of heavy fighting by the 4th Infantry Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade in 1967 and by the II CTZ Mike Force in 1969. The camp was moved further west to Ben Het in January 1968 and the Dak To camp was closed o/a 5/15/68. It was converted for use by the 95th Border Rangers on or about 12/31/70. Dak To and Ben Het were both located in Dak To District, Kontum Province.
Veteran Tributes.
www.veterantributes.org/TributeDetail.php?recordID=178
Here you will find a description of the action seen by Col. Artice Elliot during the fighting at Dak Seang in 1970. An excerpt: "During this period, the 3d Battalion was engaged in combat with elements of the 28th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in the vicinity of Dak Seang Special Forces Camp. Despite heavy direct and indirect fire weapons barrages at the onset of each attack, he would move to a position where he could direct air strikes, gunships, and artillery strikes, disregarding his own safety.".
Vietnam maps and locations of US Army firebases.
https://15thfar.org/maproom.html
YB 895-406 DAK SEANG AF 23km NW Dak To AF, “Ranger Camp”
YB 935-188 FIRE BASE 6 Hill 1001 7km NW Hill 1338 .
YB 989-152 HILL 1338 6km SSW Dak To II .
ZB 060-220 TAN CANH Inter/Sect. QL 14 & Rte. 512 to Ben Het.
ZB 043-225 DAK TO & Spec. Forces Camp “New” 42km NW Kontum.
ZB 013-213 DAK TO Spec. Forces Camp “Old”
Dak Pek Camp - Wikipedia
The PAVN simultaneously attacked the nearby Dak Seang Camp.
Other units based at Dak Pek included:
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery
57th Assault Helicopter Company
1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery.
The base was transferred to the 88th Border Rangers on 30 November 1970. In April 1972 AC-119K gunships killed 98 PAVN around Dak Pek.
Major General George “Speedy” Gaspard.
More information and pictures about the distinguished career of General Gaspard can be found on the many blogs published on the internet under his name.